Reasoning that is deliberative and reflective often requires the inhibition of intuitive responses. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is designed to assess people's ability to suppress incorrect heuristic responses in favour of deliberation. Correct responding on the CRT predicts performance on a range of tasks in which intuitive processes lead to incorrect responses, suggesting indirectly that CRT performance is related to cognitive control. Yet little is known about the cognitive processes underlying performance on the CRT. In the current research, we employed a novel mouse tracking methodology to capture the time-course of reasoning on the CRT. Analysis of mouse cursor trajectories revealed that participants were initially drawn towards the incorrect (i.e., intuitive) option even when the correct (deliberative) option was ultimately chosen. Conversely, participants were not attracted to the correct option when they ultimately chose the incorrect intuitive one. We conclude that intuitive processes are activated automatically on the CRT and must be inhibited in order to respond correctly. When participants responded intuitively, there was no evidence that deliberative reasoning had become engaged.
Introduction
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005 ) is a brief test designed to measure individuals' ability to inhibit intuitive responses in favour of reflective and deliberative reasoning. In the bat-and-ball problem, one of the best-known CRT items, participants are asked:
''A bat and a ball together cost £1.10.
A bat costs £1 more than a ball.
How much does a ball cost?"
The appealing but incorrect response, to say ''10p", is believed to be generated effortlessly and automatically by intuitive processes. Arriving at the correct response of ''5p" may require that this intuitive response is inhibited in favour of the result of sustained, effortful deliberation.
The CRT has become a popular measure of individual differences, for example it has been cited 11 times in Cognition since 2012, including 6 experiments using the test. Higher CRT scores predict better performance on various cognitive tasks, including reduced framing effects, less discounting of delayed rewards (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Frederick, 2005 ) and probability matching (Koehler & James, 2010) , resistance to the illusion of explanatory depth (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013) and conjunction fallacies (Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009) , greater metacognitive awareness (Mata, Fiedler, Ferreira, & Almeida, 2013) and less endorsement of supernatural belief (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012) , as well as performance on various tasks that pit normative responding against intuition (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011) . Scores on the CRT correlate with measures of IQ and personality characteristics, and usually predict performance on other tasks even when these are controlled for (Toplak et al., 2011) .
The CRT is viewed by some as a prototypical application of dual process theories of cognition (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2011) . Dual process theories (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014) broadly distinguish Type 1 processes that quickly and effortlessly generate intuitive responses, and Type 2 processes that are under deliberative control and are demanding on working memory resources. Consistent with this, a number of studies (Böckenholt, 2012; Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Campitelli & Labollita, 2010) have shown that performance on the CRT is predicted by a combination of dispositional factors, inhibitory control, and numerical ability.
Dual process theories differ in their account of CRT performance. Intuition is the default mode of processing in default-interventionist models (Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005) , which hold that Type 2 processes must be engaged for reflective and deliberative processing to inhibit and
